Abstract: Using a general multi-country equilibrium model with a multinational enterprise, this paper investigates the efficiency properties of separate accounting and formula apportionment. If governments are large, i.e. take into account the effect of their statutory tax rate on the interest rate, and maximize tax revenues, tax rates under separate accounting may be inefficiently high while tax rates under formula apportionment turn out to be inefficiently low.
Introduction
In 2001 the European Commission presented plans to reform the corporate income taxation, i.e. to replace separate accounting by formula apportionment, and in November 2004 the European Commission set up the so-called Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group in order employ concepts for introducing a common European tax base and to prepare the switch over from separate accounting to formula apportionment. These activities of the European Commission brought in its wake a heated discussion about the pros and cons for both corporate income taxation principles both between politicians and economists.
Under separate accounting (SA) profit is taxed where the multinational enterprise (MNE) it declares and it is well known that under SA the MNE shifts corporate income from high to low-tax countries in order to reduce its overall tax liabilities (Hines 1999 , Haufler and Schjelderup 2000 , Clausing 2003 . Governments engaged in tax competition choose inefficiently low tax rates due to a positive profit shifting externality.
To avoid profit shifting through transfer pricing, thin capitalization and other income shifting techniques the European Commission (2001) proposed in its 2001 report on company taxation in the internal market, the introduction of formula apportionment (FA).
Under FA profit income is first consolidated and then allocated back to the taxing countries according to a certain formula which reflects the MNEs activities in that country. The formula typically contains the capital (property), sales and/or payroll shares of the MNE in the taxing countries. But by distorting investment decisions FA may create its own externalities. There is a large literature which analyzes the incentive effects of FA: McLure (1980), Gordon and Wilson (1986) , Eggert and Schjelderup (2003) , Sørensen (2004) , Mintz and Smart (2005) , Nielsen et al. (2003 Nielsen et al. ( , 2006 , Riedel and Runkel (2007) , Pethig and Wagener (2007) and Pinto (2007) . These papers point out that the MNE adjusts capital and labor demand to influence the tax base and to manipulate the formula with the aim to save its tax burden. Analyzing the tax competition game Nielsen et al. (2006) , Riedel and Runkel (2007) , Pethig and Wagener (2007) and Pinto (2007) identify a positive formula apportionment externality and a negative tax base externality such that tax competition under FA may result in inefficiently high tax rates.
All these papers consider two countries which are small in comparison to the rest of the world and hence take the interest rate as exogenously given. This is insofar unproblematic, if papers stick to positive properties of the corporate taxation principle. But most papers assess the normative properties of the Nash equilibrium tax rates which is incorrect since interest effects are ignored. In contrast, the present papers develops a general multi-country equilibrium model where the capital market is explicitly taken into account. In addition, we consider large countries whose governments are aware that their tax rate affects the price in the international capital market. Then governments manipulate the interest rate in their favor while behaving Nash with regard to the other countries' tax rates.
Our model allows for different conclusions in comparison to the previous literature. In case of tax revenue maximizing governments, we find under SA next to the profit shifting externality a tax base externality. Since the profit shifting externality is positive, but the tax base externality may become negative, separate accounting may result in an race to the top. Moreover, under FA there emerges also a formula externality and a tax base externality, but both of them turn out to be positive such that FA results in a race to the bottom. Ranking formula apportionment for different formulas, it turns out that the sales formula performs best of all formulas and comes closest to the efficient solution. Comparing our results with those of the models where governments ignore interest rate effects, we find that the direction of inefficiency reverses. This shows that the policy recommendation concerning the performance of SA and FA is very sensible to the construction of the model and the small-and large-country assumption.
There is second strand of literature which is related to our paper. Since the 1980's the general equilibrium model has a long tradition in corporate income taxation. Wilson (1985 ) and Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) establish in a capital tax competition model with a large number of countries inefficiently low capital tax rates and an underprovision of local public goods. This result has been extended to settings with small number of countries (Crombrugghe and Tulkens 1990). Hoyt (1991) unifies both approaches and shows that the race to the botton sharpens when the number of countries increases. The reason for the underprovision lies in a tax base externality, namely that an increase in the tax rate in one country causes a capital flow to other countries that increase their tax revenues. It should be mentioned that in the capital tax literature firms (and not MNEs) are modeled which are located in one country and therefore are not in the position to shift profits. In addition, capital taxes have other incentive effects than corporate taxes. While the distortion of the firm's investment decision is caused by the capital tax rates in the capital tax competition model, the firm's capital demand is distorted by partial deductibility of capital under SA or FA. Finally, in the capital tax competition literature the production function displays constant returns to scale with the consequence that all income externalities cancel each other out and that the positive tax base externality results in inefficient undertaxation.
In contrast, under SA and FA production functions are assumed to display decreasing returns to scale, which makes the analysis of the tax competition for welfare maximizing governments considerably more complex and leaves unclear whether Nash equilibrium tax rates are ineffeciently low or high.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the basic assumptions under SA and FA, and then analyze the tax rate effects on the competitive equilibrium of the multi-country economy. Section 3 investigates the efficiency properties of the tax competition game when governments maximize tax revenue under SA and FA, respectively. Section 4 briefly turns to tax competition when governments maximize welfare and Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
Basic Assumptions
Consider an economy with n identical countries, indexed by i = 1, . . . , n. Each country is populated by a representative resident. There is a large number of identical MNEs operating a plant in each country. Since MNEs are identical, we restrict our attention to a representative MNE. In country i the MNE produces a private good with the production function F (k i , ℓ i ) where k i is mobile capital and ℓ i is immobile labor employed in country i. F has the usual properties:
productivities. In addition, we assume that capital and labor are complements (F kℓ > 0) and that the production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale. The latter requirement ensures that MNE's profits are strictly positive.
The MNE's tax base in country i will deviate from economic profit if the government grants only partial depreciation allowances/and or allows the MNE to deduct the cost of debt but not the cost of equity. We denote the fraction of capital cost that is deductible by the parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1] which comprises the case of full, partial and no deductibility.
In contrast, labor costs are assumed to be fully deductible. Then the tax base of the MNE in country i is given by
where r is the world market interest rate and w i is the wage rate in country i. The MNE may shift profits from its subsidiary in country i to subsidiaries in country j = i. Examples for profit shifting include manipulating the debt equity structure of the subsidiaries or the transfer prices of goods and services traded between the subsidiaries. The specific channel of profit shifting is immaterial for our purpose. We therefore simply measure shifting of the subsidiary in country i by the variable s i , where s i > 0 (s i < 0) means that the MNE shifts income from all other countries j = i to country i (from country i to all other 1 Functions are denoted by upper case letters and subscripts attached to them indicate partial derivatives.
countries j = i). But profit shifting is not costless. It comes at a concealment cost which reflects for example the expense for tax consultants and lawyers or the MNE's risk of being detected by the tax authority illegally shifting income (Kant, Haufler and Schjelderup 2000) .
The concealment cost associated to s i is represented by the U-shaped function C(s i ) with
Separate Accounting
Under separate accounting, corporate income is taxed in the country where the MNE it declares. Denoting by t j country j's statutory tax rate, the MNE's total after tax profit is given by
The MNE chooses investment, labor and profit shifting to maximize after tax profit subject to the constraint j s j = 0, and takes the tax rates and the interest rate as given. The first-order conditions
the capital market clearing condition
and the labor market clearing conditions
characterize the competitive equilibrium of the multi-country economy. In (6) [ (7) In order to analyse the (Nash) tax competition game we need the comparative static effects of tax rate changes on the competitive equilibrium of the multi-country economy.
We restrict our attention to symmetric equilibria, i.e. with equal tax rates t i =: t and with 2 λ is the Lagrange-multiplier associated to the constraint j s j = 0.
Total differentiation of (3) - (7) and then applying the symmetry assumption yields
for i = j. Due to (8a)-(8c) an unilateral tax increase in country i causes a decline in the equilibrium interest rate, and investment declines at home but rises elsewhere. The MNE reallocates capital from country i to all other countries in order to reduce the tax base in country i and hence to save tax liabilities. Since capital is complementary to labor (F kℓ > 0), decreases in capital call for a reduced labor demand, the input factor labor gets more abundant and the wage rate decreases. Hence, the wage rate shrinks at home but rises elsewhere. Finally, (8d) shows that if country i increases its tax rate, less profits are shifted from other countries to country i.
Tax competition. Countries' governments behave non-cooperatively, using tax rates as their strategic variables. The tax revenue in country i is used to finance a local public good denoted by g i . In this section we consider as a benchmark the case where each country's government chooses its tax rate to maximize its tax revenue or equivalently to maximize the provision of the local public good taking as given the other countries' tax rates and anticipating the MNE's behavior from (8a)-(8d). The assumption of tax revenue maximization reflects the idea of Leviathan governments which is often seen as more realistic than welfare maximization (see Wilson 1999) and therefore has frequently been used by previous studies on tax competition (Nielsen et al. 2006 or Pethig and Wagener 2007) .
Under separate accounting country i's tax revenue reads
The first-order condition dg i /dt i = 0 determines the country i's reaction function, i.e. its best response to the other countries tax rates t −i := (t 1 , . . . , t i−1 , t i+1 , . . . , t n ). Our main interest is to assess the efficiency properties of the equilibrium tax rates. This can be done by investigating the fiscal externalities which are reflected by the effect of country i's tax rate on all other countries' tax revenues j =i dg i /dt i , which can also be interpreted as the tax revenue effect of a coordinated tax rate change. A positive (negative) total fiscal externality shows that tax coordination leads to a Pareto improvement (deterioration) and hence the equilibrium tax rate is inefficiently low (high). Differentiation of g j from (9) with respect to t i taking into account (1) and (8a)-(8c) yields
where
To compare our results with the previous literature we decompose the total cross-country effect in two sub-externalities. The first is the profit-shifting externality (PE). If the government of country i increases t i , the MNE shifts more profits to country j which enhances country j's tax base. The profit shifting externality is positive and tends to inefficient undertaxation. There are three further cross effects which influence country j's tax based and in sum are called tax base externality (TE| SA ). First, increasing t i increases investment in country j and hence country j's tax base with the consequence that country j's tax revenues also enhance. Second, increasing t i reduces the world interest rate which also increases country j's tax base. Third, increasing t i changes the wage rate of country j.
Since labor and capital are complementary inputs (F kℓ > 0) the increased capital demand stimulates the MNE to demand more labor. Since the labor supply is fixed the wage rate increases to clear the regional labor market. The capital and interest rate effects cause positive externalities with inefficiently low tax rates while the wage rate effect causes a negative externality and tends to overtaxation. These three cross effects are opposite in sign leaving the sign of the tax base externality indeterminate in general.
However, for the special case of full deductibility of capital cost (ρ = 1) the tax base externality disappears due to F k − ρ = 0 from (3). In the other polar case ρ = 0 equation (11b) simplifies to
To obtain more specific results we now turn to CES production functions with
The first equality in (10) follows from the symmetry assumption.
is given by η :
The CES function and its derivatives can then be written as
−2 /kl. Inserting the CES function and its derivatives in (12) and, for notational convenience, defining Ψ :=τ µKV
From (13) If the tax base externality is sufficiently negative, e.g. ν → −∞, and the profit shifting externality is sufficiently small, then tax competition with separate accounting may result in an race to the top.
Finally, we consider the impact of the number of countries n on the tax rate. Implicit differentiation of dg i /dt i and focussing on symmetric Nash equilibria with tax rate t =t
Although the total externality of country j decreases upon an increase of country i's tax rate, a further country comes along and a further externality emerges in this new country.
Presupposing PE + TE| SA > 0 the externality of this additional country overcompensates the reduction of the externalties of the other countries and hence the tax rate reduces when a further country is added. The results are summarized in Proposition 1. Suppose governments maximize tax revenues and the tax competition game under separate accounting attains a symmetric Nash-equilibrium with t i =:t.
(i) Then in general the equilibrium tax ratet may be inefficiently low or high.
(ii) (a) If capital is not deductible (ρ = 0) and the production function satisfies
then the equilibrium tax ratet is inefficiently low and decreases as the number of countries increases.
It is worth mentioning that the positive profit shifting externality is present but the tax base externality is absent in models where the governments take the interest rate as exogeneously given (Nielsen et al. 2006 , Wellisch 2004 , Riedel and Runkel 2006 or Pethig and Wagener 2007 . In contrast, in the present general equilibrium model where counties' governments account for interest rate effect there emerges a tax base externality which may be negative and hence tax competition under separate accounting may result in an race to the top.
Formula Apportionment
Under formula apportionment, tax bases are consolidated and then distributed to country i according to its capital share k i / j k j , according to its sales share
according to its payroll share w i ℓ i / j w j ℓ j . In addition, we allow for convex combinations.
Denoting bei γ, σ and ϕ the weights these factors receive in the formula, the share of the consolidated tax base assigned to country i is
where x −i := (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , x i+1 , . . . , x n ) for x = k, ℓ, w, and where
. The MNE's tax burden in country i is then given by 7 t i A i j Φ j and the MNE's total after tax profit under formula apportionment can be written as
is the effective tax rate of the MNE. The objective of the MNE is to maximize the after-tax profit (16) with respect to capital, labor and profit shifting taking into account (1), (17) and j s j = 0. As tax bases are consolidated, the MNE is not able to reduce its tax liability by profit shifting. It therefore chooses profit shifting such that the concealment costs are minimized, i.e. s j = 0 for j = 1, . . . , n. The MNE's capital and labor demand, respectively,
6 Ω is the set of feasible weights. 7 When there is no risk of confusion we omit the arguments of the functions A and F . 8 The second equality in (17) follows from j A j = 1.
is characterized by the first-order conditions j =i
Given tax rates (t 1 . . . , t n ) the capital market and the labor markets in the multi-country economy clear if (6) and (7) are satisfied.
We again consider the comparative static effects of tax rate changes on the economy's equilibrium and restrict our attention to symmetric Nash equilibria with equal tax rates.
Then we have t
. The associated comparative static analysis which is delegated to the Appendix yields
for i = j. Similar to separate accounting, the MNE reduces the investment in country i upon an increase of t i , although for a different reason. Under SA the MNE reduces k i in order reduce the tax base, under FA in order to manipulate the apportionment formula.
9
Both measures aim at reducing the tax burden in country i. Hence, under FA it is not surprising that the strength of dk i /dt i depends on the formula applied. Having a closer look at (20b) it is obviously that the MNE cannot manipulate the formula at all if a pure payroll formula is used. In addition, for CES production functions the manipulation effect in absolute terms is the highest at the capital formula, formally we get the following ranking for CES production functions
Observe that the manipulation effect is a pure reallocation effect which can be seen from
9 Under FA tax bases are consolidated and hence the tax base cannot be reduced by capital shifting from one country to another country.
Concerning the wage rate w i an increase of t i has two effects. First, due to the reduced investment in country i and the complementarity of labor and capital, the MNE demands less labor. Since the labor supply is fixed the wage rate decreases, formally captured by
The second effect comes again from the MNE's incentives to manipulate the formula. Increasing t i , the MNE reduces not only its capital demand but also its labor demand in country i in order to reduce the tax burden in country i. This wage rate effect is formally given by − (n−1)Φ n(1−t) σF ℓ F + ϕ ℓ < 0 and, obviously, only if the formula contains labor the MNE's manipulation strategy is successfull. The total wage rate effect reads
and can be rearranged to (20c). Comparing the wage rate effects for different formulas we get for homogeneous production functions
(22a) does not allow for ranking the sales formula. More insights are obtained by restricting the production function to CES type
where the equality sign holds for Cobb-Douglas production functions (ν = 1).
Tax competition. Under formula apportionment the fiscal budget constraint is given by
where capital and the interest rate depend on the tax rates via (20a) and (20b). The Nash equilibrium of the tax competition game when governments maximize their tax revenues is constituted by dg i /dt i = 0 for i = 1, . . . , n and the fiscal externalities of country i's tax rate on the other countries' tax revenues are reflected by
10 Homogeneous production functions satisfy kF k + ℓF ℓ = hF where h is the degree of homogeneity.
Differentiation with respect to k and assuming h < 1 yields kF kk + ℓF ℓk = (h − 1)F k < 0 which is equivalent to F ℓk /k < −F kk /ℓ. 11 The derivation of (22b)-(22c) can be found in the Appendix.
(24) identifies two externalities, a tax base externality TE| FA and a formula externality FE| (γ,σ,ϕ) . The tax base externality is positive and goes back to the reduced interest rate which enhances the tax base in all countries. Remember that under separate accounting the MNE aims to shift capital and labor from country i into country j in order to reduce the tax burden in country i. This effect disappear at formula apportionment due to the consolidation of tax bases. Nevertheless, under formula apportionment there is another externality which stems from reallocating capital and labor. To be more specific, when raising the tax rate in country i the MNE reallocates capital from country i to county j and demands more labor in country j such that a larger share of the consolidated tax base is taxed in country j and the MNE saves tax liabilities. The formula externality FE| (γ,σ,ϕ) is positive for all (γ, σ, ϕ) ∈ Ω such that both the formula externality and the tax base externality tend to inefficiently low tax rates.
Next, implicitly differentiating dg i /dt i = 0 we obtain the impact of the number of countries on the (symmetric) Nash equilibrium tax rate as
Our results are summarized in Proposition 2. Suppose governments maximize tax revenue and the tax competition game under formula apportionment attains a symmetric Nash-equilibrium with t i =:t.
(i) Then the equilibrium tax ratet is inefficiently low.
(ii) Then the equilibrium tax ratet decreases as the number of countries increases.
In models where the governments take the interest rate as exogeneous given (Nielsen et al. 2006 , Riedel and Runkel 2006 or Pethig and Wagener 2007 there also emerge a formula and a tax base externality, but in these models the tax base externality is negative while the formula externality is positive leaving the sign of the total externality ambiguous. Quite surprisingly, when governments account for the impact of their tax rate on the interest rate, the total externality under formula apportionment turns out to be unambiguously positive.
While we know from Proposition 2 that formula apportionment results in inefficiently low tax rates we do not know which formula performs best in the sense that it comes closest to the efficient solution. In other words, we are interested in the formula which minimizes the fiscal externalities. Remember that TE| FA is independent of the formula weight and hence we need to focus on the formula externality which is presented in (26). Although we have elaborated the ranking of the capital and wage rate effects in (21b) and (22c), their interplay is not clear at all. For CES production functions the formula externality for pure formulas can be calculated as follows.
Comparing the formula externalities (28a)- (28c) it turns out that the formula externality is the lowest under the sales externality if ν ∈ [0, 1]. Hence we conclude Proposition 3. Suppose governments maximize tax revenue and the tax competition game under formula apportionment attains a symmetric Nash-equilibrium with t i =:t. If the production function is of CES type
(i) the tax rate of the pure sales formulat| (0, 1, 0) is greater than the tax rate of the pure capital formulat| (1, 0, 0) , (ii) the tax rate of the pure sales formulat| (0, 1, 0) is greater than the tax rate of the pure payroll formulat| (0, 0, 1) .
From Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 we infer that the sales formula is pareto-superior to both the payroll and the capital formula.
Finally, we compare the equilibrium tax rates under separate accounting and formula apportionment which results in Proposition 4. Suppose governments maximize tax revenue and the tax competition game under separate accounting and formula apportionment attains a symmetric Nash-equilibrium with t i =:t and t i =:t, respectively. Then it holds
In the rest of the paper we focus on welfare maximizing governments. Since each country is populated by a single resident the welfare of country i is given by the resident's utility U(x i , g i ) where x i is a private (numeraire) commodity produced by the MNE and g i is the local public good. The utility function has the standard properties U x > 0, U g > 0, U xx < 0 and U gg < 0. While the fiscal budget constraints have been presented in (9) and (23), it remains to introduce the representative consumer's budget constraint
The consumer has three sources of income. She is owner of the MNE and gets profit income, more precisely the share θ i = 1/n of the MNE's total after-tax profit Π. In addition, she earns rk and w il as capital income and labor income, respectively.
The government maximizes the utility of its resident subject to the resident's budget constraint (30) and to the fiscal budget constraint (9) 
Increasing t i reduces directly the profit income of the residents in country j, formally −Φ/n.
Moreover, increasing t i has an interest rate effect dr/dt i < 0 which in turn is responsible for increasing the profit income and reducing the capital income of country j's residents.
The net effect is ρtk
and vanishes if capital costs are not deductible at all. The non-labor externality is negative and tends to inefficiently high tax rates.
The total fiscal externality follows from the interplay between non-labor income, labor income, profit shifting, tax base and formula externalities and reads
whether separate accounting or formula apportionment leads to a race to the bottom or to a race to the top.
To obtain more clear-cut result, we simplify the present model by assuming F kℓ = 0.
One possible interpretation is that ℓ is now land which is a fixed factor in production. In addition, we assume that land does not enter the formula, i.e. we set ϕ = 0 in the subsequent analysis. This set up is also studied by Nielsen et al. (2006) and Pinto (2006) for small governments ignoring interest rate effects of their policy. Note that for F kℓ = 0 the labor externality vanishes. Since the non-labor externality is independent of the formula weights and identical under both separate accounting and formula apportionment, Proposition 3(i)
and Proposition 4 can be extended to welfare maximizing governments.
Corollary 1. Suppose F kℓ = 0 and ϕ = 0. Then the statements of Proposition 3(i) and Proposition 4 are also true for welfare maximizing governments.
Finally, we briefly turn to the case of small countries, where the number of countries converges to infinity. It is interesting to observe that country i's tax rate effect on its resident's consumption, which is formally given by
disappears if F kℓ = 0 and n → ∞. Then the first-order condition determining country i's welfare maximizing tax rate simplifies to dg i /dt i = 0 which is also the first-order condition characterizing the tax revenue maximizing tax rate. Hence we obtain the following equivalence result:
Proposition 5. Suppose F kℓ = 0 and ϕ = 0. Moreover, suppose countries are small (n → ∞), then welfare maximization and tax revenue maximization yield the same Nash equilibrium tax rates under separate accounting [formula apportionment].
Nevertheless, there is still a difference in the evaluation of the Nash equilibrium tax rates since under a welfare function there emerge additional externalities, namely (n − 1)NE, which are absent under a tax revenue function as objective for the non-cooperative solution.
Concluding Remarks
Since the European Union is one of the largest players in global trade, it seems to be unrealistic to assume that changes in the corporate income taxation of the EU will have no repercussions on the terms of trade. Hence, this paper investigates the effects of a switch over from separate accounting to formula apportionment when tax rates influence the world's interest rate, which has been neglected in the previous literature on corporate income taxation.
More specifically, our analysis reveals that the hope for increased tax revenues in the European Union under FA may not come since tax competition under FA results in a race to the bottom. This is in contrast to previous studies arguing that under FA there is a tendency toward inefficiently high tax rates. These results are derived for large countries whose governments maximize tax revenues. When turning to welfare maximizing governments there are additional externalities which leave the direction of inefficiency unclear.
In this case more specific results can only be obtained by empirically based calibrations and numerical simulations which are beyond the scope of the present paper. When turning to small countries, i.e. to countries which are so small that their tax rate's impact on the interest rate vanishes, we obtain under some qualifications an equivalence between tax rates under welfare and tax revenue maximization.
Obviously, we have simplified some aspects of the real word to keep our model tractable. One issue is certainly that we consider symmetric countries, while asymmetry plays an important role especially in the European Union. Another issue is that all countries in our model change their corporate income taxation. One could modify the model such that some countries stick to SA while other change to SA which would better reflect the existing relation between countries within and outside the borders of the European Union. These extensions may present promising avenues for future research.
which in turn inserted into (A4) gives
Plugging (A11) into (A10) establishes
Derivation of (20a)-(20d). Totally differentiating (18), (19), (6), (7) and then applying the symmetry property we get 13 j =i 
Next, we rearrange (A13) to
which is inserted into (A15) and solved with respect to dr to obtain
Inserting (A19) in turn into (A18) we obtain dk i dt i = − n(n − 1)ΦA j k i
(1 − t)F kk and dk i dt j = nΦA
13 Differentiation of j =i (t i −t j )A j ki with respect to k m for m = 1, . . . , n yields m j =i (t i −t j )A j kikm dk m which simplifies due to the symmetry assumption to (t − t) m j =i A j kikm dk m = 0.
Finally, we rearrange (A14) to 
